Excerpt from document summary
The Government of Tunisia (GOT) prohibits demonstrations that
are not pre-approved and is capable of controlling and
dispersing one in the unlikely event one could be mustered
without their knowledge.

Full Document

VZCZCXRO2013
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTU #0129/01 0651205
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061205Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6025
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 7725
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0277
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 TUNIS 000129

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, TS
SUBJECT: TUNIS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
(SEPQ) SPRING 2009

REF: STATE 13023

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. GODEC FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS
-----------------------
A. (SBU) ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN
COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATIONS?

The Government of Tunisia (GOT) prohibits demonstrations that
are not pre-approved and is capable of controlling and
dispersing one in the unlikely event one could be mustered
without their knowledge. The only known group capable of
implementing this type of demonstration would be the Tunisian
labor union UGTT. The UGTT, which is neither ethnic nor
religious, maintains a small square outside of its
headquarters which they occasionally make use of to hold
political rallies, which have included anti-American slogans
in the past.

B. (SBU) HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

There have been no anti-American demonstrations in 2008 or
2009. The GOT is very protective of the area surrounding the
Embassy and maintains a large uniformed and plainclothes
police presence around the compound. There were many
pro-Palestinian rallies across the country this year in
reaction to events at Gaza. At these demonstrations, some
anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric was allowed.
Witnesses also described a couple incidents of demonstrators
burning Israeli and American flags. Historically, there were
two small, peaceful government-sponsored demonstrations in
solidarity with Lebanon in summer 2006. A few of the
demonstrators shouted anti-American slogans and carried
anti-American signs. After the Saddam Hussein execution in
2006, the UGTT had a small anti-American rally outside of its
headquarters.

C. (SBU) HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? No.

A small group of professional women from the Tunisian
Association of Female Researchers assembled briefly outside
of the main gate to the compound in January 2009 and
displayed signs with the words "Stop the War in Gaza" on
them. They were quickly outnumbered by local police who
intervened before they reached the visitor access control
point. They were allowed to present a petition to an embassy
officer who accepted it on behalf of the Ambassador.

D. (SBU) WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATION? N/A

E. (SBU) ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED
BY U.S FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY
DOMESTIC ISSUES? N/A

F. (SBU) ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

Demonstrations are generally peaceful and the GOT strives to
ensure this by positioning large numbers of uniformed and
plain clothes police officers in the demonstration areas.
However, economic unrest and unemployment led to several
large-scale and prolonged demonstrations during the first six
months of 2008 in the south-central area of Tunisia. There
was violence reported as the demonstrators and the security
services clashed in several cities, and the GOT cut off
public access to the areas hardest hit and did not permit
media reporting of the confrontations. See below (I.) for
more details.

G. (SBU) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN
DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES? No.

H. (SBU) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED
OUR PERIMETER SECURITY LINE? No.

I. (C) HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? Yes.

Unemployment protests took place in south-central Tunisia in
February, April and June of 2008, primarily in the towns of
Gafsa, Redeyef, Kasserine, Um El Araies and Feriana. High

TUNIS 00000129 002 OF 008

unemployment, poverty, inflation and a lack of economic
development in the mining region in the governorates of Gafsa
and Kasserine sparked some of the largest demonstrations
Tunisia has seen in years. Ministry of Interior (MOI) and
Ministry of Defense (MOD) assets were deployed at various
times to restore order. According to reports, police used
live ammunition in response to the throwing of petrol bombs.
Some residents and supporters of the demonstrators rejected
police claims, dismissing them as ex post facto
rationalization for the excessive use of force by the
security services. Two demonstrators were shot and killed
and many more were wounded. Dozens of protesters were
arrested and several senior labor leaders were arrested and
subsequently sentenced to up to eight years in prison. Human
rights organizations reported that security forces used tear
gas, batons, water cannons and dogs to repress demonstrators,
and even ransacked homes and businesses in retaliation. The
Tunisian military was deployed to the city of Redeyef in June
in an effort to end the violence.

J. (SBU) HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? No.

K. (C) WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT
DEMONSTRATION?

Public protests in Tunisia are rare. The demonstrations
referred to above were confined to the mining region in
south-central Tunisia in the governorates of Gafsa and
Kasserine. The GOT strictly controls information and the
private media practices self-censorship when reporting on
matters sensitive to the GOT that could reflect negatively
upon it. The GOT attempted to minimize the extent and nature
of the demonstrations and initially would not even
acknowledge them in official communications. Areas were
cordoned off from public access and attempts by Embassy
officers to enter these areas were initially rebuffed by
security forces at road blocks. However, some did reach
Redeyef by utilizing back roads instead of the main highways.
Given the propensity of the GOT to control information, it
is not possible to obtain official statistics on the size of
the demonstrations. Unofficially, the numbers vary greatly
depending on the source. Amateur video footage posted on
YouTube suggested that the crowds consisted of more than one
thousand persons.

L. (SBU) ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

Demonstrations are generally peaceful. The events in Gafsa
and Kasserine last year prove that people will challenge
authority even in a police state, when driven to do so in
this instance by severe economic conditions. Over the time
period from January until June, there were two deaths
reported as a result of the unrest and the response from the
security forces. The number of wounded cannot be ascertained
because of the lack of credible information regarding the
demonstrations.

M. (SBU) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN
DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY? No.

2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS
----------------------------------

A. (S/NF) IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR
INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN
ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS).

There is no interstate or intrastate conflict involving the
GOT. The GOT is very proactive in terms of its internal
security and utilizes a broad definition of the term
terrorist in the application of its interests. GOT security
forces disrupted a terror cell in December 2006 and January
2007. Gun battles included two major skirmishes in Hammam
Lif and Soliman in the greater Tunis area. The GOT has
conveyed to Embassy officers they consider the cell
responsible for these actions destroyed. The problems posed
by the porous Algerian border were evidenced by the fact that
six individuals had crossed into Tunisia undetected with the
purported intent of conducting terrorist attacks.

Tunisia also faces illegal cross-border migration from
Algeria and Libya to Europe. Criminal cartels, not
necessarily based in Tunisia, continue to ferry illegal
aliens through Tunisian territorial waters and are often

TUNIS 00000129 003 OF 008

intercepted by Tunisian naval/coast guard units. Recently,
there have been increased reports of Tunisians attempting to
emigrate illegally, most likely to Italy. Some have met with
tragic results because of the poor condition of the boats, no
provisions and no life vests. It is also probable these
routes are also being used as a conduit for illegal drugs.

B. (SBU) IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY
LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL
WAR? There is no intrastate conflict within Tunisia.

C. (SBU) IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION?

All U.S. diplomatic facilities are located in Tunis,
Specifically the northern suburbs of Les Berges du Lac and
Sidi Bou Said.

D. (S/NF) HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE
CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN
ORIENTATION?

The GOT claims that the group they disrupted in January 2007
had plans to attack the U.S. and U.K. embassies and select
personnel. However, the GOT has not shared any tangible
evidence of this to date, nor was any such evidence presented
in their trial in late 2007, although one defendant admitted
that the group intended to target "crusader" sites. The GOT
considers this cell destroyed.

3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES
----------------------------------

A. (SBU) ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (LEA) PROFESSIONAL AND
WELL-TRAINED? Yes.

LEA's are professional and adequately trained. Police
officers receive one year of general police academy Training
and one year follow-on specialized training (i.e. VIP
protection, criminal investigations, motorbike patrol).
Police officers who demonstrate high proficiency in their
second year of training are recruited for special units (i.e.
special forces, anti-terrorist, quick response teams). Local
traffic police, a separate entity from other LEA's, also
receive specialized training.

The GOT utilizes large numbers of uniformed police officers
as a visible deterrent to crime and by extension, terrorism,
particularly in the capital and in popular tourist areas. In
sensitive areas, such as near government buildings or even
the U.S. Embassy, they also utilize plain-clothes officers to
supplement their capabilities.

B. (C) HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO,
PLEASE ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING.

Yes, but not recently. DS/ATA has had a long relationship
with the GOT, however, the last DS/ATA training occurred in
August 2004. Thirty-two GOT officials participated in an
airport security management seminar. Since then, DS/ATA has
offered a variety of training opportunities, which were
either turned down at the last minute or deadlines for
participation were not met. The Department of Defense
through Embassy Tunis' Office of Security Cooperation has
been more successful in providing training to Ministry of
Defense personnel but the Ministry of Defense is prohibited
from performing police activities.

C. (C) ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS,
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES?

It is widely believed that corruption is a problem within law
enforcement agencies, but it is practically impossible to
substantiate because the GOT does not release such
information. In early 2004, the GOT created the position of
Chief Inspector of the Internal Security Forces and Customs
within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to investigate
corruption and other law enforcement abuses. Little
information about the activities of this group or any other
corruption within the Tunisian law enforcement community is
officially released or able to be verified, therefore it is
difficult if not impossible to assess the level of internal
corruption. There are widespread reports, however, of
traffic police soliciting bribes to forego issuing traffic
tickets.

TUNIS 00000129 004 OF 008

D. (S) ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE
OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? Yes.

The GOT maintains an active internal and modest external
intelligence network focused on preserving civil peace and
order within Tunisia's borders. Through extensive use of
informants and surveillance, the GOT produces
intelligence-related information and aggressively addresses
any perceived threat to national security and regime
stability.

In order to further combat domestic terrorism, the Ministry
of Interior and Local Development (MOI) has centralized
terrorism investigations in its Tunis office. The police and
paramilitary National Guard divisions of the MOI have each
established an antiterrorism director to coordinate terrorism
investigations and share information more easily.

E. (S/NF) HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE
WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT?

Although the intelligence services continue to streamline
their liaison decision-making processes, the GOT continues to
impede dissemination of information outside of the GOT, even
during a threat. In fact, internal controls within the GOT
limit how information is shared between the office of the
President, MOI, Security Services and MOD. From the outset
of the MOI encounter with the terrorists in Hammam Lif
(southeast suburban Tunis) on December 23, 2006 until the
final confrontation in Soliman (farther southeast of Tunis)
on January 3, 2007, the GOT did not/not share any information
concerning the threat against the U.S. Embassy with anyone in
the Embassy despite specific formal and informal requests
from the Ambassador, DCM and other section heads.
Originally, they stated that the incident involved organized
crime elements. On January 5, 2007, the GOT informed the
Ambassador that the U.S. and U.K. Embassies were among the
group,s intended targets. One week later, the GOT made a
public statement to that effect. Gradually, the GOT provided
more specific information regarding these events. Through a
concerted effort, relations and information sharing have
improved but the majority of information originates from the
U.S. side.

On criminal investigations, official requests to the MOI
regarding information on criminal activities, specifically
incidents against Americans continue to go unanswered or to
be delayed. Criminal Leads have been passed with no response
in years past. This does not necessarily mean that no action
was taken, but no report or follow-up were shared with RSO.
Recently, the Legal Attach based in Rabat has had all
requests for meetings canceled or postponed, even though
multiple dates had been suggested in the Diplomatic Note to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting the meetings. One
letters rogatory requesting interviews with the FBI was
granted in 2007.

F. (S/NF) ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST
THREATS IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES
BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES?

Beyond the December 2006/January 2007 incidents, the GOT has
in some cases accepted repatriation of captured Tunisian
extremists who face prosecution for violation of Tunisia's
anti-terrorist laws. They are promptly sentenced upon their
return. Two Guantanamo detainees were transferred in summer
2007 and ten more remain in custody there.

G. (SBU) HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE
SECURITY? Yes.

The GOT provided the Embassy with significant protective
resources and security support for many high level visits in
2008, including the Secretary of State and several
Congressional delegations. The GOT officers are professional
and conscientious. Provided the request is scheduled in
advance, the GOT provides assistance to include motorcade and
traffic support, and also motorbike and foot patrols (uniform
and undercover). When the Secretary of State stayed in a
beach-front hotel, there were maritime patrols as well.

When demonstrations began occurring across the country in
support of the Palestinians in January of 2009, the police

TUNIS 00000129 005 OF 008

presence at the Embassy was visibly increased even though the
possibility of a spontaneous demonstration was extremely low.
We do not expect a change in the GOT's responsiveness to our
requests for support.

H. (SBU) HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT
MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD;
GOOD/AVERAGE; POOR)

The Embassy would assess airport security as good/average.
The GOT is working to expand its airport services and hopes
to be a major African hub; therefore the GOT has increased
airport security overall. Numerous uniformed officers are
positioned on the roadway in front of the main terminal and
there are also checkpoints for traffic entering the terminal
area.

The most recent information regarding airport safety
available to the RSO is from 2007 when officials from the
United Kingdom visited the Tunis/Carthage International
Airport. The officials indicated that the security of the
airport changed depending on the personnel on duty. Based on
observations of our personnel this is considered accurate, as
at times the police have ratcheted up their level of
inspection of persons entering the airport without
explanation.

Additionally, a number of visitors to Tunisia arrive via
cruise ships. Since Tunisia is a popular destination for UK
citizens, UK Department for Transport representatives visited
the La Goulette commercial seaport, also in 2007. They
determined the security at Tunis' major seaport to be
good/average. They echoed the airport safety officials' 2007
statements in regards to the attentiveness of police
personnel on site.

I. (S) HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS
AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

Average. During a visit to the Port of Rades, Tunisia's Main
container port, by CODEL Costello in August 2007, the
Director General of the Merchant Marine and Ports Office
(OMMP) and the OMMP's Director of Port Security and Safety
noted that the Port is in full compliance with the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and has
been recognized for security best practices. The delegation
was given a demonstration of the Port's container scanning
procedures. The OMMP claimed that 100 percent of all
imported and exported containers are scanned. The OMMP also
shared photographic evidence of x-ray images that led to the
GOT,s interdiction of several smuggling incidents involving
weapons, drugs, and illegal immigrants.

Immigration controls appear to be effective at international
airports and we have no specific evidence to the contrary.
Land borders are considered porous. GOT security elements
are specifically concerned about their western border with
Algeria.

As stated above, Tunisia also faces illegal cross-border
migration from Algeria and Libya to Europe. Criminal cartels
continue to ferry illegal aliens through Tunisian territorial
waters and are often intercepted by Tunisian naval/coast
guard units and merchant vessels on their way to Italian
islands. Tunisia is not typically the launching point,
however.

J. (S/NF) HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE;
AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

Average. The GOT continues to patrol its border areas with
aging equipment although additional refurbished UH-1H
helicopters have been received and put into service. There
have been ten helicopters received since 2007. Its limited
budget hinder the national guard's border patrol
capabilities. The GOT continues to request US assistance in
obtaining new equipment for this purpose, specifically
helicopters, sensors, night vision goggles and spare parts.

Along the Algerian border north of the Sahara Desert, the
paramilitary National Guard is stationed as a first line of
defense with the army five kilometers inland for support.
The National Guard relies on static posts and both forces
conduct continuous patrols. The army operates a small number
of ground surveillance radars which provide limited coverage

TUNIS 00000129 006 OF 008

due to both their inadequate numbers and the age of the
equipment. The military exclusively patrols the more porous
southern Sahara borders with Algeria and Libya and relies on
the same type of aged radar equipment. Security is often
increased along the borders around major holidays.

Two Austrian nationals were kidnapped in February 2008 while
visiting the southwestern desert. The GOT alleged they had
strayed over the border into Algeria when they were abducted
but subsequent debriefings since their release contradict
that official explanation, leading us to believe the action
took place in Tunisia. The Austrians were released unharmed
in Mali after a large ransom was paid.

--------------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------------

4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS
---------------------------------------

A. (S/NF) ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST
GROUPS IN COUNTRY?

The group that targeted the Embassy is believed to be the
linked to Al Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). Based on publicized arrests and capture of Tunisian
Islamic extremists involved in support and execution of
extremist activities in Spain, Belgium, Italy, Bosnia,
Denmark, Iraq and the trial of thirty terrorists allegedly
planning domestic attacks, one must conclude there are
further anti-American elements in Tunisia who support
violence against the U.S. presence in Tunisia and Iraq.

The support of Islamic extremism appears to be linked to the
global jihad movement. One alarming fact associated with the
December 2006/January 2007 incidents indicates that the group
of six who illegally entered Tunisia via the Algerian border
in April 2006 was able to recruit over thirty more
individuals for their cause in only six weeks.

In the past, Tunisian terrorist groups who were known to be
active outside of Tunisia and who have espoused anti-American
views, such as the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG aka Tunisian
Islamic Fighting Group) and the Tunisian Islamic Front (TIF),
may still have supporters in Tunisia although it is unlikely.
The GOT contends that these groups are totally shut down.
They are illegal and the GOT has arrested and imprisoned
members.

Although the GOT does not publicly acknowledge their
existence, it can be safely assumed that terrorists and
terrorist sympathizers are present in Tunisia. It should
also be noted that the GOT banned the Islamist party
an-Nahdha (Renaissance), which it considers to be a terrorist
organization. Several an-Nahdha leaders were sentenced to
lengthy jail terms in the 1980s. Rachid Ghannouchi, the
leader of an-Nahdha, lives in exile in London.

B. (SBU) IF YES, HOW MANY? 3. PLEASE NAME GROUPS. See above

C. (SBU) HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN
THE LAST 12 MONTHS? No.

D. (SBU) WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? N/A

E. (SBU) HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? No.

F. (SBU) HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY,
OR U.S.-RELATED TARGETS? No.

G. (SBU) HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC
REGIONS OR DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? N/A

H. (SBU) IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? N/A

5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
-------------------------------------------

A. (SBU) ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT
ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? None known.

B. (SBU) IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. N/A

TUNIS 00000129 007 OF 008

C. (SBU) HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN
AREAS WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? No.

D. (SBU) WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE? N/A

E. (SBU) HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN
THESE ATTACKS? N/A

-----------------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
----------------------

6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICTORS
-------------------------------------------

A. (S/NF) ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUP THAT HAVE A
PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? Yes.

PROVID NAMES: AQIM and other pro-Islamic insurgent
symathizers.

B. (S) HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESNCE? IS IT AN
OPERATIONAL CELL? FINANCIAL CELL SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA
CELL?

Based on th direct threat against the Embassy mentioned
abov and the presence of Tunisians actively participatng in
terrorist activity around the world (i.e. adrid train
bombings, Iraqi suicide attacks, Guatanamo detainees),
operational, financial nd support cells exist in Tunisia.
Without specific evidence to the contrary, presence of
propaganda cells can be assumed.

C. (C) IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

No. The GOT actively pursues these groups, as they are a
threat tothe current regime and its economic base - tourism.

D. (S) ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANZATIONS
(NGOS) IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATINSHIP WITH ANY OF
THESE GROUPS?

A popular, no-militant and influential NGO is the Da'Wa
Al-Taligh. This Islamic NGO, which has been present in
Tunisia since the mid-1970's, has been operating hroughout
the countryside and in urban neighborhods, urging strict
observance of Koranic teachins. The Embassy suspects that
sme elements of the Da'Wa may use this organization as a
cover to recruit youths for extremist activities.

E. (SBU) ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN
COUNTRY THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

Yes, some Arab nationalists and Islamic sympathizers in
Tunisia would support groups with radical Arab and Muslim
causes.

F. (S/NF) HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE
OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA,
SUDAN, ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL
ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS?

Hostile intelligence services exist in Tunisia; however, it
is difficult to assess their abilitis. Their ability to
conduct acts of terrorism oreven conduct intelligence
operations are cnstrained due to their limited resources and
the strict covert and overt Tunisian surveillance against
foreign missions.

G. (S/NF) HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS
AND EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR
HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS?

The GOT would argue that it has excellent control of
information and intelligence that minimizes the ability of
hostile groups to smuggle and transport weapons and
explosives. The sandy desert borders shared with Algeria and
Libya combined with the aging border patrol equipment provide
an opportunity for entry of illegal munitions. GOT raids and
encounters in December 2006 and January 2007 produced a
variety of automatic weapons (Kalashnikovs) and explosive
ordnance (ammonium nitrate, TATP). The GOT informed the U.S.
Embassy that it found fifty to sixty kilograms of explosives
fabricated in Tunisia. In 2007, to combat the fabrication of
explosives in Tunisia, the GOT announced changes in the types

TUNIS 00000129 008 OF 008

of fertilizers that are permitted for use in country.

The support systems that produced and transported these
weapons from the border regions throughout the country
indicate that it is not as difficult as the GOT would have us
believe. Further we cannot assume that the GOT has been able
to seize all illegal weapons or explosives.
Godec